God vs The Multiverse

Click here for God vs The Multiverse: a rational argument for the Existence of One God who intelligently designed one universe.

Monday, March 18, 2013

The Purim Song (Part 6: Final Svara)

We think there is a deeper way to understand the previous machlokes between רבא and רב נחמן based upon a conceptual connection between the first and second parts of the sugya.

To develop this approach, we begin with a question: 

רבא argued that we do not say הלל on Purim because we are still the servants of אחשורוש and this servitude prevents us from saying הלל.   According to this logic, why doesn't our current state of exile prevent us from saying הלל on any day of the year? 

We believe the answer is that the הלל that is being postulated in this sugya is an essential feature of publicizing the miracle, and as such, we must judge whether the miracle itself warrants a publication accompanied by הלל or not.  It is not relevant what our present state at this very moment is. The servitude to אחשורוש tells us that the story of the מגילה itself does not warrant הלל. 

This idea is in line with the original reasoning of the gemara which tied the derivation for saying הלל to the reading the מגילה.  Namely, the gemara attempted to derive both of them from the comparison to the song of אז ישיר, which was both an instrument of publicizing the miracle and a song of praise.  

It would seem that it is not merely a coincidence that these two features  of אז ישיר are found together, but rather there is an intimate conceptual connection between them.  The purpose of publicizing a miracle is not merely to convey the cold intellectual knowledge that God has control of nature, that His providence relates to man, etc.  Rather, a major purpose of the transmission is to bring the receiver of the information to a state of recognition of God's greatness and kindness, which should result in an expression of הלל.  This is the premise of the gemara's question that we should also say הלל.

With this idea, we can explain the machlokes of the previous post on a deeper level.  We could say that everyone really agrees that הלל, in and of itself, could be fulfilled entirely through an implicit הלל.  However, the dispute revolves around whether an obligation to say הלל that is a קיום in the publicizing of a miracle can be implicit, or whether it must be an explicit הלל.

רב נחמן maintains that since the reading of the reading the מגילה brings a person to an internal state of הלל, the publicizing of the miracle achieves its objective.  Every person who hears the מגילה is brought to a state of הלל, and the publicizing of the miracle has achieved both of its objectives: transmitting the intellectual information and bringing the receiver to a state of praising God.

However, those who argue on רב נחמן maintain that since this הלל (if it were to exist) is not just a regular הלל, but is tied to the publicizing of the miracle, it must be done openly and expressly.  In other words, הלל is not simply the objective of the publicizing, but is rather part and parcel of the very act of publicizing itself.  The publication of the miracle must include the fact that this miracle evokes a reaction of הלל and therefore an implicit הלל does not suffice.

In summary, the argument revolves around the connection between the publicizing and the הלל. Namely, רב נחמן maintains that the publicizing must bring about הלל.  For this, an implicit הלל suffices. The others argue that the publicizing itself must include the idea that these events bring about הלל and therefore a manifest הלל should be needed.

6 comments:

  1. You-According to this logic, why doesn't our current state of exile prevent us from saying הלל on any day of the year?

    Me-I thought the idea that we were servants to Achashverosh was because he was an essential player in the salvation, so we were psychologically mushabed to him...would that apply for our current state? (For pesach we say hallel because it was hashgachas hashem bnigla that saved us, no human was essentially involved.)

    You-However, those who argue on רב נחמן maintain that since this הלל (if it were to exist) is not just a regular הלל, but is tied to the publicizing of the miracle, it must be done openly and expressly. In other words, הלל is not simply the objective of the publicizing, but is rather part and parcel of the very act of publicizing itself. The publication of the miracle must include the fact that this miracle evokes a reaction of הלל and therefore an implicit הלל does not suffice.

    Me-If publicizing is transmission of the explicit information of the megilla to a person/people, and then they latently process the information of the workings of the hashgacha which brings them to a halllel ie he intellectually grasps the essence of megilla( the hashgacha saving the jews) and then naturally has an emotional shevach...that in itself is a "miracle(that) evokes a reaction of hallel(emotionally in the person)"... I don't see the need to say hallel verbally?


    You-In summary, the argument revolves around the connection between the publicizing and the הלל. Namely, רב נחמן maintains that the publicizing must bring about הלל. For this, an implicit הלל suffices. The others argue that the publicizing itself must include the idea THAT THESE EVENTS BRING ABOUT HALLEL AND THEREFORE A MANIFEST HALLEL SHOULD BE NEEDED."

    You-"...that these events bring about הלל and therefore a manifest הלל should be needed."--that can happen with an emotional hallel--why the NEED for explication of the words of hallel(same question as above.)....You SEEM to be saying that the emotional state of hallel does come about as per Rav Nachman-"maintains that the publicizing must bring about hallel"...unless the machlokes is whether or not in metzios the natural emotional state does come about...According to Rav nachman it does-therefore that emotional state is enough, according to rava that natural state does not necessarily come about therefore an explicit hallel is necessary(which will naturally induce an emotional state)...Then this would be a machlokes in metzios...This is my understanding of what you're saying.


    However you seem to be saying that it is not machlokes in metzios " With this idea, we can explain the machlokes of the previous post on a deeper level. We could say that everyone really agrees that הלל, in and of itself, COULD BE FULFILLED ENTIRELY THROUGH AN IMPLICIT HALLEL. However, the dispute revolves around whether an obligation to say הלל that is a קיום in the publicizing of a miracle can be implicit, or whether it must be an explicit הלל.

    ...meaning the emotional shevach DOES exist according to everyone, the only question is whether it has to be explicated in a hallel...

    I hope this is clear.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. First question: We think it is clear that even in the times of Achashveirosh they said Hallel on yom tov, for instance. Also, the gemara is explaining why NOW we dont say hallel on purim.

      Second question: Since הלל is part and parcel of the very act of publicizing itself, it must be done in an open public manner. (internal will not suffice for this).

      Delete
    2. Second question: Since הלל is part and parcel of the very act of publicizing itself, it must be done in an open public manner. (internal will not suffice for this).

      Publicizing can take place in two ways: a publicizer and people who process the information-a classical action of publication. However, saying hallel, even in a tzibbur, is a person saying words to himself and processing the information of the words. The individuals of the tzibbur are saying the words to themselves and the action of the individual is not declaring the words or messages to a public forum. (It's only that the action takes place in a public forum.) I don't see how an action is "part and parcel of the very act of publicizing itself" if you're not publicizing information via that action( merely saying words of hallel to the self in a public situation.)

      First question: We think it is clear that even in the times of Achashveirosh they said Hallel on yom tov, for instance. Also, the gemara is explaining why NOW we dont say hallel on purim.

      Right they did say hallel on yom tov because they related to the event of yetzias mitzraim as being from the hand of God. However the miracle of purim was, to the average person, constructed through achashverosh, therefore there would be no internal hallel. It would be artificial because the average person relates the miracle to achashverosh.(during pesach we are Slaves of God because we relate the miracle to God, however purim we are servants of achashverosh because we relate the miracle to him. That is the 'avdus of achashverosh' of the gemara.)

      Also it would seem that the gemara wants to know why even then they did not set up a chiyuv hallel. Why only now?

      Delete
    3. Unless the opening bracha as well as the "hodu lahashem.." and 'unas' are being mefarsem the hashgacha of hashem(even though the tzibbur is repeating it)

      However if it is an act of pirsum, why can't the chazan just say it and the tzibbur will just listen(this might be a side question)just like megilla. They will be yotzei through shomea koneh.

      Delete
    4. Reading the megilla is an act of publicizing but does not need a tzibbur. Apparently the tzura of the action of kriah is defined as publicizing irrespective of whether there happens to be people present. Similarly, if there was an explicit reading of the hallel that went with the reading of the megilla, then part of the publication would be that this was an event which moved the people to hallel. For this, an implicit hallel will not suffice as it is not part of the manifest content of the action and therefore not part of the message which is publicized (though it can evoke an internal response).

      Delete
  2. Reading the megilla is an act of publicizing but does not need a tzibbur. Apparently the tzura of the action of kriah is defined as publicizing irrespective of whether there happens to be people present.---this needs to be explained, but not completely relevant to the discussion at hand.

    Similarly, if there was an explicit reading of the hallel that went with the reading of the megilla, then part of the publication would be that this was an event which moved the people to hallel. For this, an implicit hallel will not suffice as it is not part of the manifest content of the action and therefore not part of the message which is publicized (though it can evoke an internal response).

    It seems like there are two pirsums: a pirsum of the event of megilla which leads to a pirsum of general hashgacha(in the hallel- any event the hallel describes as hashgacha). I guess that can be the formulation for the pirsum...However even if it is pirsum, once again, is there a possibility where the chazan can be korei and then the tzibbur is yotzei?(as per megilla though this might be a side question)...

    Overall though both tzuras seem funny(megilla because how is it publication if it can be done by oneself...also hallel as saying words to oneself in a tzibbur is not a classic action of publication ie; saying information that other people process in a gathering...only the person himself is processing the information of his words...this is my understanding of how publication works in the 'real world')


    ReplyDelete

In the words of Agur bin-Yakeh: "We welcome all comments, questions, contributions, and critiques - but if you insist on posting anonymously, PLEASE use a pseudonym rather than posting as "Anonymous," since this makes it much easier to carry on a normal discussion. Thank you!"